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Free Markets and Government Regulation: The Competing Views
of Thomas Woods and George Cooper
I. INTRODUCTION

As a result of the worldwide financial crisis, a deluge of
books attempting to explain the causes of the crisis and suggesting
new fiscal policy has flooded bookstands.1 These books span the

ideological spectrum and propose a variety of different actions.
This overabundance of literature leaves many scratching their
heads and wondering which one best captures the truth behind the
confusion. Experts and newcomers alike should be able to choose

a book that accurately and clearly outlines the current situation.
Two books currently experiencing success and sparking debate are
George Cooper's The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks,
Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy2 (Origin) and
Thomas E. Woods Jr.'s Meltdown: A Free-MarketLook at Why the
Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government
Bailouts Will Make Things Worse3 (Meltdown). Cooper is a British
economist currently working with Alignment Investors." He also
"has worked as a fund manager at Goldman Sachs and as strategist

for Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan." 5 Thomas Woods is a senior
fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute 6 and has authored nine
1. A search on amazon.com for "financial crisis" returns fifteen different books
on the first page dealing solely with the current financial crisis. The search returns
over 25,000 non-fiction books, including 275 released within the previous ninety days
at the time of the search (last searched Feb. 6, 2010).
2.

GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS,

CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY (Vintage Books 2008)
[hereinafter COOPER].
3. THOMAS E. WOODS JR., MELTDOWN: A FREE-MARKET LOOK AT WHY THE
STOCK MARKET COLLAPSED, THE ECONOMY TANKED, AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS

WILL MAKE THINGS WORSE (Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2009) [hereinafter WOODS].
4. See COOPER, supra note 2, at first unnumbered page inside cover.
5. Id.
6. About Tom Woods, http://www.thomasewoods.com/about/ (last visited Feb.
6, 2010). For Mises Institute, see generally About the Mises Institute, http://mises.
org/about.aspx (last visited Feb 6, 2010) (describing the Ludwig Von Mises Institute
as "the world center of the Austrian School of economics and libertarian political and
social theory" and providing its location as Auburn, Alabama).
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books covering topics as diverse as the Latin Catholic mass, the
free economy, and American history. These works represent
markedly different viewpoints, with Cooper's book debunking
free-market theory, and Woods's condemning governmental
regulation and oversight of markets. The competing theories
contained in these books encapsulate the main arguments on
either side of the financial blame game.
The theory that the economy is an independent force that
naturally finds equilibrium, known as the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH), has pervaded economic thought and caused
much confusion and debate throughout this financial crisis.8 While
Thomas Woods's argument that government intervention
essentially caused this crisis by disturbing the equilibrium is
convincing, George Cooper's dismantling of the EMH and
proposals for a better understanding of the economy ultimately
provide a superior explanation of today's circumstances and
describe a promising path towards restoring financial stability.9
The policy proposed by Cooper, close observation of the markets
coupled with minimal, but necessary, market regulation, offers the
most realistic path toward reaching economic stability.
Part II of this note will discuss Woods's Meltdown, its
support of unregulated free markets, as well as literature and
opinions from proponents of the author's arguments.'0 Part III will
analyze Cooper's Origin, focusing on its introduction and
subsequent dismantling of the EMH and the introduction of the
financial instability hypothesis (FIH)." Part IV will synthesize the
competing arguments, noting differences between the two while
identifying shared ideas and assertions. 2 Finally, Part V will
7. About Tom Woods, supra note 6.
8. See generally Joe Nocera, Poking Holes in a Theory on Markets, N.Y. TIMES,

June 5, 2009 at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/06/business/
06nocera.html (saying that throughout the 2000's, the EMH suffered "some serious
body blows"); Brian Milner, Sun Finally Sets on Notion That Markets are Rational,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 3, 2009, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/

globe-investor/investment-ideas/features/taking-stock/sun-finally-sets-on-notion-thatmarkets-are-rational/articlel206213 (calling the EMH "discredited" but explaining
that many are attempting to salvage it and apply it to the current crisis).
9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See

infra pp. 556-59.
infra Part II, pp. 549-54.
infra Part III, pp. 555-59.
infra Part IV, pp. 560-63.
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propose the adoption of the FIH as the generally accepted
economic theory and the implementation of a "lighter governor"' 3
approach to financial regulation. 4
II. THOMAS E. WOODS JR.'S MELTDOWN

A.

Arguments Presented

In the book, Meltdown, Thomas Woods makes his case for
a free-market approach to the economy. 5 The free-market
economy can be summarized as a "market in which there is little
or no control or interference by government or by any other
or entity, such as a monopoly, cartel, or
powerful economic force
16
oligopoly.'
collusive
Clearly, the idea of a free-market economy does not
comport well with government regulation of the financial sector.17
In fact, Woods makes clear his belief that government regulation is
the primary cause of the current economic crisis.'8 He assures the
reader almost immediately that "[t]he current crisis was caused not
by the free market but by the government's intervention in the
market."' 9 He claims that the market adjusts itself to maintain a
balanced state and that recessions and downturns are simply the
market "encouraging people to live within their means as [it] is
now trying to do." 20
Woods adheres to an economic ideology known as the
Austrian School. 21 This "school" is a collection of like-minded
economists who believe strongly in free-market principles and
assert that "[tIhe market economy is self-correcting and will
13. COOPER, supra note 2, at 137.
14. See infra Part V, pp. 563-66.
15. See generally WOODS, supra note 3 (describing throughout alleged failings of
government intervention in economic matters).
16. "Free market," DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (Barrons,

1995).
17. See id.
18. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 2.
19. IdatZ
20. Id at 6.
21. About Tom Woods, supra note 6; see also About the Mises Institute, supra
note 6 (describing the Mises Institute as "the world center of the Austrian School of
economics and libertarian political and social theory").
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quickly eliminate the earlier government-generated errors in
investment, unless the process of adjustment is interfered with by
government policies."22 The group has fallen in and out of favor
within the economic community, alternating between holding a
strong, central position and being seen as an outsider in economic
thought.2 3 The mainstream success of Meltdown14 may well be an
indicator of a renewed interest in the group's tenets.
After his initial assertion that the free market is not to
blame for the current economic situation, Woods proceeds to
name different government actors and policies from the past few
decades that he considers to be responsible.2'
The Federal
Reserve Board (Fed) receives the most scathing assault from
Woods, being described as "the single greatest contributor to the
crisis that continues to unfold before us" ' 26 and "the elephant in the
living room that ...is the one breaking all the furniture. 2 Woods
points to the Fed's consistent efforts to keep interest rates low in
order to prop up the housing market as contributing heavily to the
creation of the real estate bubble, which led to the collapse of the
real estate market and a domino effect throughout the financial
sector.& He also criticizes the creation of new money postSeptember 11,29 writing that "it was all the new money [the Fed]
created that gave the biggest stimulus to the unnatural rise in
housing prices. '3°
He lists other "culprits" for the current crisis, all of which
directly relate to governmental action or regulation in some way."
He discusses Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, saying that Fannie was

22. Peter J. Boettke & Peter T. Leeson, The Austrian School of Economics:19502000, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 445, 451 (Warren J.
Samuels et al. eds., Blackwell 2003).
23. Id. at 445.
24. Meltdown, http://www.thomasewoods.com/books/meltdown/ (last visited Feb.
6, 2010) ("Ten weeks on the New York Times bestseller list!").
25. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 13-29.
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id. at 9.
28. See id. at 27.
29. See id. at 26 (noting that the amount of money created between 2000 and
2007 was more than in all of American history combined).
30. Id. at 27.
31. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 13-32.
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32

and decrying their "politically
instigated" advocacy of "lower lending requirements in the name
of helping 'disadvantaged' groups., 33 Woods characterizes the
Community Reinvestment Act, a law designed to "encourage
depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the
communities in which they operate, 34 as a form of affirmative
action in lending.
He argues that, as a result of this law, loans
were given to many people who did not possess the requisite
finances to repay the loan and pay off their mortgages.36 Woods
also cites problems with the numerous tax breaks for
homebuyers. 3' He maintains that tax breaks are, by their very
nature, a good thing but should be evenly spread across the
economy to many different types of purchases so as to avoid
"artificial stimulus to any one sector of the economy."3' 8
B.

Policy Proposals

Woods does not simply place blame.3 9 After establishing
what he perceives to be the root of the problem, he makes policy
suggestions.40 He takes issue with the idea that any financial
'
institution is "too big to fail. 41
This is not a new insight.42 In fact,
many economists of the Austrian School identify the too big to fail
doctrine as contributing to the recession of the 1980s.43 Criticism
of too big to fail actions has grown steadily since the current
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 15.

34. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. 2901(b) (2006).
35. See WOODS, supra note 3,at 17.

36. See id. at 18-21 (Woods quotes Henry Cisneros, former Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, as conceding that "people came to
homeownership who should not have been homeowners.").
37. See id. at 24-25.
38. Id. at 25.

39. See infra p. 551 and note 40.
40. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 145-56.

41. See id. at 31-32.
42. See infra p. 551 and note 43.
43. See Roger W. Garrison, The Federal Reserve: Then and Now, 8 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 14-15 (1994) ("The Federal Reserve's routine functioning as
lender of last resort, the FDIC's de facto policy of forbearance in cases of problem
banks, and the implicit acceptance of the doctrine of 'too big to fail,' all help to
account for the length of the artificial boom.").
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financial crisis began. 44 Woods argues that "these firms we're told
are too big to fail are in fact too big to be kept alive.",4' This
argument reflects the belief that, as one commentator writes,
"[c]apitalism is a Darwinian economic system dependent upon the
survival of the fittest." 46 Companies that do not perform as they
should serve only to harm those that succeed by "drain[ing] capital
and resources from fundamentally sound firms . . . .,
If the
market allows only the fittest institutions to survive, Woods
argues, the end result will be a stronger, more adaptable
economy. 48 Woods asserts that a governmental policy (or a lack of
action whatsoever) allowing these failing institutions to fold would
not cause an economic apocalypse,
but rather provide a "step
49
forward for the economy.,
Many prominent economists have publicly expressed their
rejection of the "too big to fail" doctrine, including Mervyn King,
Governor of the Bank of England. ° He recently said that:
If some banks are thought to be too big to fail, then,
in the words of a distinguished American economist,
they are too big. It is not sensible to allow large
banks to combine high street retail banking with
risky investment banking or funding strategies, and
then provide an implicit state guarantee against
failure.5

44. See David Gaffen, Does 'Too Big to Fail' Signal a Turning Point?,WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2008, at C5 ("[U]se of phrase 'too big to fail' for banks so important or
interconnected that they cannot be allowed to go under has ballooned to 670 uses in
2008 from 252 in 2007 and 142 in 2006.").
45. WOODS, supra note 3, at 40.
46. Tim Hughes, System is Sick at Heart: Capitalism in Crisis When the Weakest
Are Deemed Too Big to Fail, COURIER MAIL (Australia), Nov. 15, 2008, at 78,
availableat 2008 WLNR 21764877.
47. WOODS, supra note 3, at 41.
48. See id. at 40.
49. Id.
50. See Jill Treanor, King Calls for Banks to be "Cut Down to Size," GUARDIAN
(London), at 26, June 17, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/
2009/jun/17/king-in-bank-reform-call.
51. Id.
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While King does not agree fully with Woods that these
institutions should be allowed to completely dissolve, they
demonstrate the rift within the economic community, especially
between government agents and free-market economists, as to
rescue of failing financial institutions is the
whether governmental
5 2
best policy.
The bailout of these firms points to the bigger problem that
Woods sees as central to the whole crisis: government
intervention. 3 His proposal to allow failing firms to go bankrupt is
indicative of a hands-off approach to the economy.- He lays out a
number of policy proposals near the end of Meltdown that reflect
the arguments he makes throughout the book.5 In addition to
allowing "too big to fail" institutions to fail, he calls for the
16
Expressing
dissolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
frustration with the government's policy of propping up these
institutions, he writes that "Fannie and Freddie should be put into
bankruptcy receivership, and their assets auctioned off to private
Woods believes that this would
mortgage guarantors. 5 7
demonstrate the government's refusal to show preferential
treatment to institutions that exhibit "inefficiency and
mismanagement on a stupendous scale. 5 18 He also calls for a
cessation of bailout packages and a cutback on government
spending. 9 Doing so, he argues, will "free up resources for wealthgenerating activity. ' 60 One of the most important ideas that
Woods advocates is open, honest debate about the Fed and its
future. 6' He maintains that it is "long past time that the Federal
Reserve be put back on the table as a subject for debate ... it is

52. See id.
53. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 2.
54. See id. at 31-32.
55. See id. at 147-56 (One of these proposals, the complete removal of
government involvement in the production of money, while thought-provoking and
quite radical, is too heavy to discuss in this note and the author does not feel it has a
place in the current discussion.).
56. See id. at 148-49.
57. Id. at 148.
58. Id. at 149.
59. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 149-50.
60. Id. at 149.
61. See id. at 151-52.
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responsible for more economic instability than any other
institution. ,62
Woods is not alone in suggesting these policies, especially
his discussion of the Fed.
Former presidential candidate
Representative Ron Paul (R-TX) recently introduced legislation in
the House that would require an audit of the Fed and a subsequent
report to Congress on the findings.63 As of February 2010, the bill
had 317 cosponsors. 64 Five different times (in 1999, 2002, 2003,
2007, and 2009), Representative Paul also introduced a piece of
legislation called the Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act. 65 The
latest version is still under consideration by the House Committee
on Financial Services and would repeal the Federal Reserve Act
and dismantle the Fed completely. 66 In an editorial, Harvard
economist Jeffrey Miron called for "getting rid of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac" and "policies like the Community Reinvestment
Act," as well as "letting troubled financial institutions declare
bankruptcy., 67 While Woods presents compelling arguments and
interesting policy changes, his book predominantly provides
criticism while suggesting sweeping change, and, as a whole, does
not provide the best option for those attempting to gain a serious
grasp of the current economic situation. 68

62. Id. at 151.
63. Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009, H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (as
introduced to House, Feb. 26, 2009).
64. Govtrack.com, H.R. 1207: Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ bill.xpd?bill=hll 1-1207 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
65. See Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act, H.R. 833, 111th Cong. (as
introduced in House, Feb. 3, 2009); Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act, H.R. 2755,
110th Cong. (2007); Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act, H.R. 2778, 108th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2003); Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act, H.R. 5356, 107th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2002); Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act, H.R. 1148, 106th Cong. (1st Sess.
1999).
66. Govtrack.com, H.R. 833: Federal Reserve Board Abolition Act,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ bill.xpd?bill=hlll-833 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010)
(follow "Summary" hyperlink).
67. Jeffrey A. Miron, Editorial, Bankruptcy, Not Bailout, Is the Right Answer,
CNN, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/29/miron.bailout/
index.html?iref=storysearch.
68. See infra pp. 558-59 and notes 97-108 (demonstrating the applicability of the
FIH to the current crisis and its relative superiority to free market and EMH
explanations).
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III. GEORGE COOPER'S ORIGIN

A.

Arguments Presented

George Cooper uses his book, Origin, to present an
economic philosophy deeply rooted in support for government
intervention and the belief that markets do not innately correct
themselves. 69 Cooper spends a large portion of his book
debunking the EMH or, as he calls it, the "efficient market
fallacy."7 ° He describes the EMH as, unfortunately, being "the
bedrock of how conventional wisdom views the financial system,
the key premise upon which we conduct monetary policy and the
framework on which we construct our financial risk systems."7'
Fully appreciating the arguments that Cooper makes
requires an understanding of the EMH.72 The theory came to
prominence with a paper published in 1970 by Eugene Fama of the
University of Chicago. 73
According to the EMH, market
movements are a manifestation of a constant search for a natural
equilibrium interrupted only by external intervention.

As

defined by Fama, prices in an efficient market "'fully reflect' all
available information." Accepting the idea of complete synthesis
of publicly available information, it inherently follows that "prices
are always at levels consistent with 'fundamentals. ' '7 6 Therefore,
since prices already reflect the totality of available information, it
is theoretically impossible to outperform the market under the
69. See COOPER, supra note 2, at ix-x.
70. Id. at 155.
71. Id. at 11 (It seems as though Cooper lumps free-market ideology and the
EMH into one indistinguishable mass here. Although this appears problematic, his
later presentation of superior economic theory overrides any generalizations he
makes regarding non-interventionist hypotheses.).
72. Compare supra "Free market," note 16, with Eugene F. Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970)
(illustrating that although the EMH and the free-market theory espoused by Thomas
Woods are separate economic theories, they share the idea that unregulated markets
will right themselves).
73. See Fama, supra note 72, at 383.
74. See COOPER, supra note 2, at 13.
75. Fama, supra note 72, at 383.
76. Meredith Beechey, et al., The Efficient Market Hypothesis: A Survey 2
(Reserve Bank of Austl., Econ. Research Dep't, Research Discussion Paper 2000-01,
2000) [hereinafter Beechey].
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EMH.77 Economists have accepted this hypothesis, much like with
the Austrian School, in varying degrees since its introduction.78
According to a discussion paper at the Reserve Bank of Australia:
Within a decade [of its formation], the efficient
market hypothesis was so well established that [one
contemporary] was prompted to write that he
believed there to be "no other proposition in
economics which has more solid empirical evidence
supporting it."
Such confidence portends a reversal, and the
subsequent twenty years of research and assetmarket experience have rendered the efficient
market hypothesis a much more controversial
proposition.79
After explaining the EMH to the reader, Cooper's next
goal is its dismantling.' ° He addresses what he perceives to be one
81
of the EMH's fatal flaws: "the data just doesn't fit the theory.",
Whereas free-market economists attribute the recession to market
interference by the government, Cooper writes that markets, by
their very nature, experience waves and that the lack of
appropriate regulation has allowed the crisis to spiral.82 Even if, at
some point, equilibrium is found, "once disturbed asset and credit
markets are prone to undergo expansions and contractions that, in
'3
principle, have no limit and no stable equilibrium state. "
One of the issues Cooper takes with the EMH is that,
instead of providing a legitimate explanation, it simply deflects
77. See Justin Fox, Is the Market Rational? No, Say the Experts. But Neither Are
You--So Don't Go Thinking You Can Outsmart It, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 2002, at 116,
available at 2002 WLNR 11959230 (stating, "[i]n an efficient market you can't beat
the market unless you have inside information. So why bother trying?").
78. See Beechey, supra note 76, at 21 ("[T]he subsequent twenty years of research
and asset-market experience have rendered the efficient market hypothesis a much
more controversial proposition.").
79. See id., at 21 (citation omitted).
80. See COOPER, supra note 2, at 12.
81. Id. at 30.
82. See id. at 37.
83. Id. at 93.
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blame onto investor behavior, claiming that there is no irrational
behavior on the part of investors, but rather misinterpretation of
available information. 84 The conclusion that follows is this: "to
disprove market efficiency it is necessary to prove that investors
behave irrationally., 85 This has led some followers of the EMH,
such as Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central
Bank, to go so far as to question the existence of bubbles. 6 He
stated in a 2005 speech that:
If one takes the narrow definition of a bubble very
often used by these economic researchers, there is a
fundamental difficulty in calling an observed asset
price boom a bubble: it must be proved that given
the information available at the time of the boom,
investors processed this information irrationally. 87
Cooper characterizes this defense of the EMH as using a
"slight [sic] of hand" to win acceptance.? The entire EMH rests
perilously on the assumption that investors possess all available
knowledge when making decisions. 9 Cooper writes that:
[I]f this assumption turns out to be false and
investors are sometimes denied the necessary
information to make informed judgements [sic]
about asset prices, or worse still if they are given
misleading information, then it becomes possible for
asset price bubbles to form without investors
behaving irrationally. 9

84. See id. at 109-12.
85. Id. at 110.
86. Jean-Claude Trichet, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at the MAS Lecture
in Singapore: Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy (June 8, 2005).
87. Id.
88. See COOPER, supra note2, at 111.
89. Id. at 112.
90. Id.
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This, in turn, puts the EMH in question because it removes the
ability to deflect the bubble-bust question in the direction of
investor behavior. 91
In Cooper's discussion, the EMH's other fatal flaw is its
view of credit expansion. 92 According to Cooper, the EMH
"dismisses the idea that an economy can generate an excessive
level of credit creation, and views any economic expansion as a
sign of an economy moving towards the hypothesized stable
equilibrium." 93
Therefore, EMH-centric governments must
perceive their role to be the facilitation of continuous credit
creation, a role that Cooper claims causes "a constantly increasing94
debt stock and progressively more fragile financial system.
Cooper notes that rapid credit expansion usually is the catalyst for
economic growth and that a cessation of credit growth (such as
that experienced in the current crisis) leaves the economy in a
state of instability. 9
B.

Policy Proposals

Cooper does not, however, leave the reader without a
viable financial theory. 96 He introduces the reader to what he97
ultimately sees as the best available economic theory, the FIH,
developed by the economist Hyman Minsky. 98 Minsky was an
economist and a professor at the University of California at
Berkeley, Washington University in St. Louis, and Bard College
who gained recognition during the 1960s and 1970s. 99 Because

91. Id.
92. Id. at 121-22.

93. Id. at 87.
94. COOPER, supra note 2, at 122.
95. See id. at 124.
96. See infra p. 558 and note 97.
97. See COOPER, supranote 2, at 11-12.
98. See id. at 12 (As Cooper points out in footnote six of Chapter One, "many of
the essentials of Minsky's theory had already been presented by Irving Fisher in 1933
and, according to Minsky, also by [John Maynard] Keynes in 1936." Therefore,
Minsky is seen as the catalyst for combining and refining the works of these two
economists into his FIH.).
99. See Louis Uchitelle, Obituary, H. P. Minsky, 77, Economist Who Decoded
Lending Trends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1996, at 113, available at http://www.ny
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"Minsky developed his financial instability hypothesis, in part, as
an explanation for the Great Depression," it holds particular
relevance to the current financial situation.'0°
The introduction of this theory (in comparison with the
EMH and free-market theories) illustrates a deep divide as to the
stability and efficiency of markets.' ° Whereas the EMH portrays a
self-regulating market that is on an inherent course towards
equilibrium, the FIH "argues that financial markets can generate
their own internal forces, causing waves of credit expansion and
asset inflation followed by waves of credit contraction and asset
deflation., 10 2 Because this theory is premised on the instability of
markets, it consequently asserts the need for intervention of some
kind to ensure stability. 0 3 According to Minsky, that intervention
comes from the government and, more specifically, the central
banki"4 One expert writes that, "[i]n Minsky's scenario, instability
can be averted by governmental intervention. The central banker
in the role of lender of last resort will ... prevent the collapse of
depository institutions and the destabilizing effect that would have
on the economy."10'5 The FIH not only views governmental
regulation of the market as beneficial, but "necessary."' 6 Cooper's
view is not that the government did not regulate enough in the
period leading up to the current financial crisis, but that it
regulated in the wrong way.1° He believes that the Fed's creation
of credit in order to stimulate economic growth was a misguided
policy and should be replaced by one that calls for a gentler, more
stable approach to market regulation.1°8

times.com/1996/10/26/us/h-p-minsky-77-economist-who-decoded-lendingtrends.html
?pagewanted=1.
100. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505,566 (1998) [hereinafter Pouncy].
101. See infra p. 559 and note 102.
102. COOPER, supra note 2, at 13.
103. See id. at 159.
104. See id. at 34.
105. Pouncy, supra note 100, at 568.
106. COOPER, supra note 2, at 34.
107. See id. at 163-65 (stating that the job of the central banks should not be
targeting inflation, but overseeing fiscal policy and preventing excessive debt).
108. See id. at 160-62.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 14

IV. FINDING COMMON GROUND

Although these two books ultimately reach very different
conclusions, they point to several common problems and share
scorn for many of the same government policies.'09 Their
competing free-market and pro-regulation stances, however, stand
in stark contrast to each other."n Whereas Thomas Woods wants
the reader to walk away from Meltdown with an admiration of
free-market thought and distrust of government intervention in
financial affairs,"' George Cooper aims to disprove the EMH and
inspire in the reader confidence in both the FIH and the power of
government regulation."' However, important truths arise in each
book, and the manner in which each author addresses those truths
complement each other.
The books differ greatly in their view of the Fed and its
future in economic regulation." 3 Woods writes that the Fed is
"responsible for more economic instability than any other
institution" and that a shift in economic thought that seriously
considers the abolishment of the Fed is taking place "not a
moment too soon.", 114 On the other hand, Cooper asserts that

"central banks are a vital part of our financial architecture.' '15
Hiding in that fundamental difference is the common opinion of
the authors that the Fed's economic policies of credit creation
were flawed and consequently failed." 6 The more vocal opponent
of the Fed, Woods writes clearly that "[a]s long as the Fed can
create as much money as it wants and push interest rates down to
destructively low levels, bubble activity - that is, wealth-destroying
activity that seems profitable only because the Fed has kept
interest rates artificially low - will occur somewhere."' 7 Cooper
109. Compare COOPER, supra note 2, at 121-22 (discussing the inherent instability
created by limitless credit creation) with WOODS, supra note 3, at 25-29 (naming the
Fed's credit creation as one of the problems in the current financial crisis).
110. See infra p. 560 and notes 111-12.
111. See WOODS supra note 3, at jacket summary.
112. See COOPER, supra note 2, at ix-x.
113. See infra p. 560 and notes 114-15.
114. WOODS, supra note 3, at 151.
115. COOPER, supra note 2, at 37.
116. See infra pp. 560-61 and notes 117-18.
117. WOODS, supra note 3, at 31.
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writes that "credit creation is not just an important
macroeconomic variable, it is the important macroeconomic
variable. 11 8 Clearly, both authors share the conviction that
unrelenting credit creation is the Fed's critical error, one that led
the economy down the path to near collapse." 9
These ideas reflect a common sentiment within the
economic community that central banks have, to an extent, failed
in their job. 20 One economic observer in October of 2007, nearly a
year before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, wrote, "[t]he Fed
emerged from the crisis 20 years ago with its reputation not just
unscathed but also enhanced. This time round, the central banks'
faults are painfully visible.' 121 Indeed, as one commentator
colorfully wrote: "What happened to our money? If you think it's
not worth what it used to be, you're right. And if you think you've
' 22
been robbed by inflation created by the Fed, you're right again.
Furthermore, both Woods and Cooper express concerns
regarding the performance and foresight by top government
officials in charge of economic regulation. 3 Woods points to
statements made in 2007 and 2008 by Henry Paulson, Secretary of
the Treasury and Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed.2 4 In 2007,
Secretary Paulson said of the global economy, "it's as strong as
I've seen it in my business career," m and followed that statement
in 2008 with the assurance that "[o]ur financial institutions are
strong. Our banks are strong. They're going to be strong for
many, many years.' ' 126 Bernanke spoke similarly, indicating in 2007
that "[wie do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime

118. COOPER, supra note 2, at 125.

119. See supra pp. 560-61 and notes 117-18.
120. See infra p. 561 and notes 121-22.
121. The World Economy: Lessons from the Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20,

2007, at 54, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=9988758.
122. John F. McManus, What Happened to Our Money? If You Think It's Not
Worth What It Used to Be, You're Right. And If You Think You've Been Robbed by
Inflation Created by the Fed, You're Right Again, THE NEW AM., Feb. 4, 2008, at 33,
availableat 2008 WLNR 25338395.
123. See infra pp. 561-62 and notes 124-131.
124. WOODS, supra note 3, at 157.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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27
market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.',
Cooper, echoing Woods's attitude, noted that "[ilt is a strange
paradox that today's central banks are generally staffed by
economists, who by and large profess a belief in a theory [EMH]
which says their jobs are, at the very best, unnecessary and more
likely wealth-destroying., 12 8 Again, their shared skepticism
regarding these leaders arises from intrinsic ideological
differences.
Whereas Woods believes that their role is
unnecessary and impossible to fulfill,13° Cooper expresses doubts
about their ability to effectively regulate a market that they do not
believe can or should be regulated.1 3 Despite these differences,
their common distaste for current job performance is clear.3
As is always the case in perilous times, the crisis has led
many to question the preparedness and capability of the leaders
charged with preventing such occurrences.'33 Since the onset of the
crisis, many economic commentators have publicly criticized the
actions of America's economic leaders, such as financial
commentator William Pesek, who mocked, "[w]hy should
investors worry when they know Bernanke aims to keep the
merry-go-round turning?, 13 4 The criticism does not stop with
pundits and reporters.
The sentiment has spilled over to
Congress, with some senators

suggest[ing that] the Fed and the administration are
in denial about how bad things really are. Senators
from both parties also criticized the administration
and the Fed for responding too slowly to growing
127. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Address to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43d Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition: The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17,2007).
128. COOPER, supranote 2, at 25.
129. See infra p. 562 and notes 130-31.
130. See WOODS, supra note 3, at 157 (claiming that government intervention is
not the best situation for a market and that "free individuals" must be responsible for
the markets).
131. See COOPER, supranote 2, at 25.
132. See supra p. 562 and notes 130-31.
133. See infra note 134.
134. William Pesek, Go Ahead - the Fed Will Protect You, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 8, 2007, at 17, available at 2007 WLNR 19743716.
135. See infra p. 563 and notes 136-37.
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economic problems. Instead of sounding alarm
bells, Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of
New Jersey said the administration hit the snooze
button. While acknowledging officials should not
talk down the economy, he argued the
administration was downplaying the dangers.136
Menendez later suggested
that Bernanke was "trying to hide [his]
137
head in the sand.,
Most importantly, numerous former Fed officials share the
authors' frustration, with many of these prominent economists
publicly voicing their concern with the Fed's response to the
crisis.138 Bernanke has been described as being in "a position of
weakness, not strength."139 Perhaps the most damning criticism
comes from Martha Seger, a former Governor of the Federal
Reserve System, who blasts the Fed and echoes Cooper's unease
by saying that "[t]hey're out of touch with what's going on in the
real world. The problems that are out there go way beyond Wall
Street. 1 40 Whether they arise from a foolish adherence to the
EMH or a vain attempt to regulate an untamable market, these
statements demonstrate a belief that current Fed policy is
insufficient and potentially damaging.141 Changes must be made.
V. TAKING THE NEXT STEP

The financial crisis makes clear that, all ideological
differences aside, the current financial system needs to be fixed.
Both George Cooper and Thomas Woods propose modifications
in fiscal policy that they believe can restore the economy to health
and provide stability in the future.1 42 Their ideas, though both
136. Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 15, 2008).
137. Id.
138. Scott Lanman, As Bernanke Retreats, Critics Ask is he Prime Time,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601014&
sid=aSXMwc6.2a7Q&refer=funds.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Compare COOPER, supra note 2, at 157-67 with WOODS, supra note 3, at 147-
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and even prosperity, differ
strive towards economic strength
• 1 143
radically and are incompatible.
In the end, only one of these
plans provides the most potential for positive change. George
Cooper's strategy is both logical and practical.
Logically, economic theory guides economic policy.
Therefore, the theory guiding the Fed and American policy must
be sound and based in reality. Yet as long as the EMH guides our
policy, "our economic theories [will] not explain how our
economies work."' 44 Cooper, having rejected the EMH, calls for a
general acceptance of Minsky's FIH,'14' an appeal echoed by

prominent economists.'" The very foundation of the FIH is
financial instability: the assertion of unstable markets. 47 The
recognition of instability necessitates appropriate regulation.1 48 To
this point, the EMH-bred appeal of constant economic "growth,"
whether legitimate or born solely of inflation and credit creation,
has seduced regulators into implementing policies that have
spiraled downward into the current crisis.' 49 A new approach to
regulation must be taken and Cooper's suggestion to regulate with
a "lighter governor" holds promise.
James Clerk Maxwell was a nineteenth century scientist
who published a paper containing his findings on "governors," the
metal pieces that controlled the speed of industrial machinery. 5 '
Internal mechanisms of early industrial machines sped up or
slowed down randomly,'52 but a governor could keep the machine
within a certain range of speed.'53 According to Maxwell, the most
143. Compare supra notes 39-68 and accompanying text with 96-108 and
accompanying text.
144. COOPER, supra note 2, at 157.
145. See id. at 158 (Cooper does not claim that the FIH is absolute and/or the
ultimate evolution of economic theory. Instead, he espouses its adoption "until
better ideas come along.").
146. See e.g. Squawk Box (CNBC television broadcast Aug. 7, 2008) (George
Magnus, senior economic advisor at UBS, explains the beginnings of the economic
crisis using Minsky's reasoning).
147. See supra p. 558 and note 97.
148. See COOPER, supra note 2, at 158.
149. See id. at 87.
150. See id. at 133-37.
151. See COOPER, supranote 2, at 133.
152. See id. at 134.
153. See id. at 134-35.
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efficient type of governor was a "lighter governor', 5 4 that would
automatically slow the machine down or speed it up to keep within
the acceptable range.' Analogizing these unpredictable machines
with unstable markets, Cooper argues that the Fed must take a
similar approach in regulating the economy. 156
Rapid growth is not always in the best interest of the
markets, and slight decline must not be seen as inherently evil or
damaging.15 Therefore, according to Cooper, regulators must
keep the economy within a determined optimal range of growth or
decline by acting as a "lighter governor., 158 Incorporating this
approach once again brings the issue of credit creation to the
forefront.
As previously established, credit creation causes
accumulation of debt. 59 If the Fed were to act as a "lighter
governor," constant credit creation would be seen as the economic
danger that it is and, consequently, tightly controlled. 60 Support
for this concept has grown tremendously within the economic
community as economists search for a way to end the recession
and regain financial steadiness.16'
VI. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the two books discussed in this Note,
belief as to what caused the financial crisis spans the spectrum.
Fingers have been pointed in every direction: misinterpretation of
information by investors;' 62 inherent market instability;'63 excessive
154. See id. at 137.
155. See id. at 136 (The use of the word "lighter" deserves explanation. Maxwell
contrasts this type of governor, which intermittently applies the requisite pressure to
the machine with one that applies a constant pressure in an attempt to control the
machine. While this governor is in fact regulating the machine's behavior, it is not
"heavy" in the sense that it often is not regulating the machine actively.).
156. See id. at 137-39.
157. See COOPER, supra note 2, at 159 ("Ideally we should move beyond
considering all economic contractions as symptomatic of policy failure, viewing them
instead as a normal part of the operation of a healthy vibrant economy.").
158. See id. at 160-62.
159. See supra p. 558 and note 94.
160. See COOPER, supra note 2, at 137-38.
161. See Wolfgang Munchau, Recession is not the Worst Possible Outcome, FIN.
TIMES, July 7, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9c760d54-4bcO-lldd-a490-000077b
07658.html?nclickscheck=l (proposing a very similar set of policy changes).
162. See supra pp. 557-58 and notes 84-91.
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credit creation;"' irresponsible governmental real estate policy;1 65
and, most frequently, the Fed. 16 Free-market thought is quick to
shuffle all of the blame onto the government for its poor economic
regulation and, quite frankly, the fact that it regulates at all. 67
Efficient market advocates preach the natural stability of markets
and similarly claim that government intervention into the markets
is damaging and ill advised.'66 Perceiving the market as unstable
and in need of regulation leads to disappointment in current
69
regulatory principles and cries for a new approach.
The argument put forth by Thomas Woods in Meltdown is
well conceived and logical.
At first glance, his easily
understandable thesis seems to explain adequately the economic
crisis. Its luster fades, however, when compared with the
explanation that George Cooper offers in Origin. Expressing the
same frustration with Fed policies that Woods puts forth, Cooper
alternately presents the markets as inherently unstable and in
desperate need of appropriate oversight. 7 ° His call for adoption of
the FIH and clear, compelling advocacy for a "lighter governor"
approach to governmental regulation best fill the needs of a reader
who seeks to understand the crisis and identify the most promising
way out of it. The Originof FinancialCrises: CentralBanks, Credit
Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy is the superior work and
is a beneficial guide to the current situation for newcomer and
expert alike.
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